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the depositor to countermand his order to pay from the account. In short, the
funds represented by the item no longer belong to the depositor.
This case indicates the one point in time short of final payment when
those rights are also terminated: a decision by the, bank to pay the item
accompanied by some action indicating that decision. This occurred two days
before service of the trustee writ (garnishment), even though final payment
itself did not occur until after service of the writ when the process of posting
was in fact completed. As against the owner of the item, however, the bank
could have changed its mind at any time before final payment without
liability. Sections 4-303 and 3-418.
S.L.P.
ARTICLE 9: SECURED TRANSACTIONS
SECTION 9-204. When Security Interest Attaches;
After-Acquired Property; Future Advances
CAIN V. COUNTRY CLUB DELICATESSEN
25 Conn. Sup. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (1964)
Annotated under Section 9-401, infra.
SECTION 9-301. Persons Who Take Priority Over
Unperfected Security Interests:
"Lien Creditor"
CAIN V. COUNTRY CLUB DELICATESSEN
25 Conn. Sup. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (1964)
Annotated under Section 9-401, infra.
SECTION 9-302. When Filing Is Required to Perfect
Security Interest; Security
Interests to Which Filing Provisions
of This Article Do Not Apply
CAIN V. COUNTRY CLUB DELICATESSEN
25 Conn. Sup. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (1964)
Annotated under Section 9-401, infra.
SECTION 9-312. Priorities Among Conflicting
Security Interests in the Same Collateral
CAIN V. COUNTRY CLUB DELICATESSEN
25 Conn. Sup. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (1964)
Annotated under Section 9-401, infra.
SECTION 9-313. Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures
CAIN V. COUNTRY CLUB DELICATESSEN
25 Conn. Sup. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (1964)
Annotated under Section 9-401, infra.
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SECTION 9-401. Place of Filing; Erroneous Filing;
Removal of Collateral
CAIN V. COUNTRY CLUB DELICATESSEN
25 Conn. Sup. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (1964)
The defendant opened its restaurant business in July, 1962, using kitchen
and display equipment obtained from Hewitt Engineering, Inc.
On August 16, the defendant took a loan from First Hartford and gave
in return a promissory note and security interest in all of its present and
after-acquired personal property and fixtures. The day before, First Hartford
had filed in accordance with Section 9-401 a financing statement with the
local town clerk where filing was required in order to perfect security interests
in fixtures, and a duplicate with the secretary of state where filing was
required to perfect security interests in personal property.
On August 30, the defendant and Hewitt executed a conditional sales
contract for the Hewitt property which the defendant had been using. The
contract provided that "the equipment shall remain personal property regard-
less of any affixation to . . . realty. . ." A financing statement which pur-
ported to give Hewitt a security interest in all of the defendant's then present
property was filed the same day with just the local town clerk.
After less than four months, the defendant went into receivership. In
this action the receiver sought a determination of priorities between First
Hartford and the assignee of Hewitt, General Electric.
The court first distinguished between the Hewitt and the non-Hewitt
goods. Despite the all-embracing financing statement which Hewitt had filed,
the court found that the security agreement embraced only Hewitt goods.
There being no security agreement with respect to non-Hewitt goods, no
security interest could attach under Section 9-204(1). First Hartford, on the
other hand, did have a security interest in the non-Hewitt goods by virtue of
its comprehensive agreement with the defendant; therefore, its priority to
those goods was assured.
By alternate reasoning which assumed arguendo that General Electric
did have a security interest in non-Hewitt goods, the court confirmed First
Hartford's priority. In regard to non-Hewitt personal property, First Hart-
ford had perfected its secuity interest under Section 9-302 by filing with the
secretary of state. Hewitt had not perfected by filing there, thus First Hart-
ford took priority under Sections 9-312(5) (a) and 9-301(1)(a). In regard
to non-Hewitt fixtures, First Hartford took priority under the same sections
by filing first with the town clerk.
With regard to the Hewitt goods, the court first noted that as of August
15 when First Hartford filed or August 16 when the security agreement was
executed, the defendant-debtor did not have "rights in the collateral." There-
fore, First Hartford's security interest could not attach at that time. To
hold otherwise, the court said, "could result in goods, such as equipment,
becoming subject to the security interest . . . although the debtor's possession
were only that of a mere bailee, apart from any purchase or contract to buy."
601
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The court went on to say, however, that after the Hewitt goods were sold to
the defendant on August 30, the defendant acquired rights in the goods, and
that at this time, under Section 9-204(1), the goods became subject to the
after-acquired property clause in First Hartford's security agreement. The
court then held that, with respect to the Hewitt goods which had not been
affixed to realty when First Hartford's security interest attached, First Hart-
ford had priority; it had filed with the secretary of state whereas Hewitt
and General Electric had not. Moreover, with regard to the Hewitt goods
which had been affixed, First Hartford also took priority. Since Connecticut
law was controlling on the definition of fixtures under Section 9-313(1), and
since Hewitt and the defendant were competent under Connecticut case law to
determine as between themselves the character of the Hewitt property, the
court found in accordance with their conditional sales contract that the
Hewitt goods were personal property, even if affixed to realty. Being items
of personalty, security interests with respect to them could be perfected only
by a filing with the secretary of state. This, however, Hewitt and General
Electric failed to do, filing only with the local town clerk. Under Sections
9-312 (5) (a) and 9-301(1) (a), the failure of Hewitt or its assignee to file with
the secretary of state made their unperfected security interest subordinate to
the perfected one of First Hartford.
COMMENT
By refusing to find any "rights" of the defendant-debtor in the Hewitt
goods prior to the written contract of sale, the court stimulates curiosity about
the business arrangements which allowed the restaurant to use Hewitt's
equipment. Of course, a binding contractual intent might have been formed
before First Hartford filed on August 15 if Hewitt and the restaurant had
agreed on the essentials of their bargain nearly concurrently with the delivery
of the equipment. Even a rental arrangement would seem to create at least
an equitable contract right in the use of the equipment for the remaining
lease term, to which in theory a security interest might attach if and when
the right were sold. As the court indicates, however, a bailment in hopes of
a sale would create no rights in the bailee. Instead of engaging in a sterile
discussion of these possibilities, the court dwelt on the failure of the Hewitt-
General Electric combination to file under the Code according to their own
definition of the collateral. While the court was probably wrong in deter-
mining priorities on this basis, the lesson is clear: it is safer and cheaper for
the attorney to suggest redundant filing rather than rely on an artificial defini-
tion of the property involved.
The court also recognized that where there is no intent to create a
security interest, a financing statement cannot create one. Better practice
would use consistent language to describe collateral in the security agreement
and the financing statement. To the extent that the Hewitt-General Electric
problems arose from lack of coordination or ignorance of the Code, the
.
message of this case and the availability of related model forms should dis-
courage repetition.
S.E.S. II
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SECTION 9-504. Secured Party's Right to Dispose
of Collateral After Default; Effect
of Disposition
HUDSPETH MOTORS, INC. V. WILKINSON
382 S.W.2d 191 (Ark. 1964)
The defendant dairyman bought a used truck on conditional sale from the
plaintiff automobile dealer who allegedly assured him that the truck was in
good shape mechanically and used little or no oil. After having paid two in-
stallments over a period of five months, the defendant attempted to repudiate
the contract by asserting breach of warranty. The plaintiff repossessed the
truck, resold it at private sale, and brought the present suit for the balance
due. More than a week before the sale, the plaintiff had sent the defendant
notice by certified mail, but the defendant, living on a rural mail route, did
not pick up the letter until after the sale. The defendant defended on two
grounds, lack of knowledge of the sale and breach of warranty. He also
counterclaimed for breach of warranty. At trial he testified that on the first
day he drove the truck he discovered mechanical difficulties and high oil
consumption but that after a test drive the plaintiff's mechanics denied that
there was anything wrong with the truck. The defendant had the necessary
repairs made by someone else at his own expense and drove the truck daily
for more than five months until the engine "blew up." The trial court in-
structed the jury that if the defendant had no knowledge of the proposed
resale before it took place, he was entitled to a verdict. The jury found for
the defendant generally.
On appeal, the court found, first, that reasonable notification of resale as
required by Section 9-504 had been given in accordance with Section
1-201(26), whether or not the defendant actually came to know of it.
Second, the defendant had not effectively exercised his right to reject under
Section 2-601, because he had failed to notify the seller of his rejection within
a reasonable time as required by Section 2-602. He could have revoked his
acceptance under Section 2-608 if his acceptance had been induced by the
seller's assurances that the defects would be corrected, but the court found
that no assurances had been given. Therefore, on the plaintiff's claim, judg-
ment in favor of the defendant was reversed. Furthermore, on the counterclaim
for breach of warranty the plaintiff was entitled to an instructed verdict.
COMMENT
Although its decision may have been wise in ending litigation without
resort to another jury trial, the court wrongly limited the buyer's rights with
respect to his acceptance of non-conforming goods. In constructing a brief
for the defendant, the court ignored the full effect of the buyer's option to
accept non-conforming goods, given him by Section 2 -601. After acceptance,
the buyer is obligated to pay under Section 2-607. But he also keeps the
defensive remedies open to him, such as damages for breach under Section
2-714. Although the buyer's complaint to the seller's mechanics did not
amount to notice of rejection or revocation of acceptance, it appears to have
603
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
been sufficient notice of breach of warranty under Section. 2-607. (Official
Comment 4) so that breach of warranty damages should have been con-
sidered as a possible support of the trial court's judgment for the defendant
buyer on his counterclaim.
S.E.S. II
SICEELS V. UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP.
222 F. Supp. 696 (1963), reversed in part, 335 F.2d 846 (1964)
Annotated under Section 1-203, supra.
ARTICLE 10: EFFECTIVE DATE AND REPEALER
SECTION 10-101. Effective Date
MEADOW BROOK NAT'L BANK V. ROGERS
253 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Nassau County Ct. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-305, supra.
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